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ITERATED REFLECTION OVER FULL DISQUOTATIONAL
TRUTH
MARTIN FISCHER & CARLO NICOLAI & LEON HORSTEN
Abstract. Iterated reflection principles have been employed extensively to
unfold epistemic commitments that are incurred by accepting a mathematical
theory. Recently this has been applied to theories of truth. The idea is to
start with a collection of Tarski-biconditionals and arrive by finitely iterated
reflection at strong compositional truth theories. In the context of classical
logic it is incoherent to adopt an initial truth theory in which A and ‘A is true’
are inter-derivable. In this article we show how in the context of a weaker
logic, which we call Basic De Morgan Logic, we can coherently start with such
a fully disquotational truth theory and arrive at a strong compositional truth
theory by applying a natural uniform reflection principle a finite number of
times.
1. Introduction
In the paper we pursue the strategy of iterating reflection principles on a ba-
sic truth theory TS0 that encapsulates, or so we argue, the fundamental building
blocks of truth-theoretic reasoning. Its components are: a theory of the objects
of truth (syntax theory in our case), basic truth-theoretic principles that enable
us to infer Tp q from a sentence   and vice-versa. In order to remain faithful to
these assertability conditions for truth ascriptions, classical logic cannot be used
on account of the liar paradox. In particular, one should be prepared not to have
the rule of conditionalization for all sentences. Also, it is desirable to work at the
right level of generality by, for instance, reasoning without committing oneself to
paracomplete or paraconsistent options. We employ a logic that does this and call
it, following [9], Basic De Morgan logic (cf. §2 for the definition).
The theory TS0, however, may not be all there is to truth. Many authors have
discussed further desiderata for truth – such as full compositionality – that are
out of reach for our basic theory TS0. Recently, Leon Horsten and Graham Leigh
have studied iterations of reflection over a basic theory in classical logic [18]. Their
classical starting point, however, leads to a loss of the intimate connection between
truths and their assertability that is present in TS0. In the following we therefore
extend Horsten and Leigh’s strategy in the framework of Basic De Morgan logic.
Reflection is rooted in the fundamental intuition that we are committed to the
truth of the sentences that are provable in a theory that we accept. This operation
can be expressed in di↵erent ways: as global reflection, where we make explicit use
of the truth predicate, or as uniform reflection, where we express this intuition
schematically without direct reference to truth. In the classical case, global and
uniform reflection are provably di↵erent operations: a variety of well-known theories
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of truth can be closed under uniform reflection but not under global reflection.1
However, this is not so in the case of Basic De Morgan logics and variations thereof,
where global and uniform reflection coincide for a wide class of theories containing
the truth principles of TS0.
The theories that we study in this work, resulting from the iteration of reflec-
tion over TS0, can be characterized as internal axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed
point construction – specifically, its four-valued version based on Basic De Mor-
gan Logic as it can be found in [14] – because their principles and rules are all
sound with respect to this class of models. The paradigmatic case of an internal
theory is PKF [15]. These theories are faithful to the fixed-point models and in-
teract well with the process of reflection. There is an alternative array of theories
capturing Kripke’s construction externally. They are couched in classical logic and
they are meant to be faithful to the set-theoretic definition of this class of models.
Among the external theories we find the well-known classical axiomatization KF of
Kripke’s construction [8], and also the iteration of reflection studied by Horsten and
Leigh [18]. Although external axiomatizations invoke principles that are not valid
in the intended semantics and they usually cannot be closed under global reflec-
tion, they are usually proof-theoretically stronger than the corresponding internal
axiomatizations. As a consequence, they also deem true more sentences that belong
to the intended extension of the truth predicate than the corresponding internal
axiomatizations; for some authors (cf. [14,16]), this is considered a clear advantage
over internal theories.
For instance, KF is proof-theoretically much stronger than its natural internal
counterpart PKF. The former proves transfinite induction for all sentences of the
language with the truth predicate up to any ordinal smaller than "0, the latter only
up to any ordinal smaller than !!. The main result of the present article is that two
steps of reflection over TS0 enbles us to recapture all principles of PKF and prove
significantly more transfinite induction than what is available in PKF. Moreover,
iterated reflection on TS0 enables us to reach the strength of KF.
2. The core laws of truth
In this section we introduce the main components of the theory TS0. We first
introduce a two-sided sequent version of Basic De Morgan logic and state some
simple properties of this calculus. We then introduce the principles governing the
objects to which truth is ascribed, which will amount to the axioms of a very weak
arithmetical theory. Finally we state the truth theoretic principles of TS0.
2.1. Basic De Morgan Logic. We employ a two-sided sequent calculus BDM
reminiscent of the one employed in [14]; sequents are expressions of the form  )  
where  ,  are finite sets of formulas. We write ¬  for {¬A | A 2  }. BDM is a
subsystem of a suitable two-sided classical calculus; its axioms and rules are listed
in Table 1. Intuitively, BDM is obtained from classical logic by replacing the usual
clauses for negation with (CP1) and (CP2) below. However, the general negation
rules (CP1-2) enable us to derive the sequents A ) ¬¬A and ¬¬A ) A for all
formulas A and make the following contraposition rule admissible in BDM:
 )   (Cont)¬ ) ¬  .
1Examples are the system KF from [8] plus the axiom stating that the extension of the truth
predicate is consistent and the system FS from [13] originating in [11].
ITERATED REFLECTION OVER FULL DISQUOTATIONAL TRUTH 3
The following closely related lemma will be extensively used in what follows:
Lemma 1. For a language L0 with signature S = {P1, . . . , Pn}, if for all atomic
formulas A of L0 we can prove ) A,¬A, then BDM formulated in L0 is closed
under the following classical rules for negation:
 )  , A
(¬L)¬A, )  
A, )  
(¬R)
 )  ,¬A
BDM enjoys standard properties of Gentzen-type sequent calculi such as substitu-
tion, inversion, and cut elimination.
A natural semantics for BDM is given in terms of four-valued models, that is we
also allow predicates with a partial or a paraconsistent behaviour (gaps and gluts).2
The intended satisfaction relation has a double clause: a sequent is satisfied in a
model M just in case if all formulas in the antecedent are true in M there is a
formula in the consequent true in M, and if all formulas in the succedent are false
in M, there is a false in M formula in the antecedent. BDM is sound and complete
with respect to the semantics just hinted at (see [3]).
A) A for A 2 LT
 )   (LW)
A, )  
 )   (RW)
 )  , A
 )  , A A, )  
(Cut)
 )  
¬ )   (CP1)¬ )  
 ) ¬  (CP2)
 ) ¬ 
A,B, )  
(L^)
A ^B, )  
 )  , A  )  , B
(R^)
 )  , A ^B
A, )   B, )  
(L_)
A _B, )  
 )  , A,B
(R_)
 )  , A _B
 , A(t) )  
(L8)
 , 8xA)  
 )  , A(t)
(R9)
 )  , 9xA
 )  , A(x)
(R8)
 )  , 8xA
 , A(x) )  
(L9)
 , 9xA)  
x not free in  ,  x not free in  , 
Table 1. The system BDM
2Our logic is close to what is sometimes called FDE. We follow, however, Field’s terminology
in [9, Ch. 3].
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2.2. The theory TS0. The basic theory TS0 and all its extensions will be formu-
lated in the language of arithmetic L = {0, S,+,⇥, exp}. With x not occurring in
the L-term t, expressions of the form (8x  t)'(x) and (9x  t)'(x) are said to
be obtained from '(v) by bounded quantification:  0-formulas (or elementary) of
L are formulas that contain only bounded quantifiers. The classes of ⌃n and ⇧n
formulas of L are then defined in the usual way. In practice, we work in the expan-
sion of L with finitely many function symbols corresponding to suitable elementary
operations and the truth predicate T. We call the resulting language LT. We call
a formula of LT arithmetical if it does not contain occurrences of T.
To formulate TS0, we first consider identity, which is governed by usual principles:
) t = t(Id1)
s = t, A(s)) A(t)(Id2)
TS0 will also contain initial sequents ) A for all basic axioms A of a suitable
system of arithmetic, in our case Kalmar’s elementary arithmetic EA formulated in
LT (cf. [2, 12]).3 In addition, our basic theory features an induction rule
( 0-IND)
 , A(x)) A(x+ 1), 
 , A(0)) A(t), 
for x not free in A(0), , , t is arbitrary, and A is a  0-formula of the language L
of arithmetic without the truth predicate. We call the resulting system Basic.
The core principles of truth capture the fundamental idea that one is justified in
asserting a sentence A precisely when she is justified in asserting that A is true.
Definition 1 (The system TS0). TS0 is obtained by extending Basic with the initial
sequents
T(pAq)) A(T1)
A) T(pAq)(T2)
for all LT-sentences A.
TS0 stands for ‘truth sequents’. The subscript 0 indicates a restriction of induction
to  0 formulas; its absence indicates full induction. The semantic conservativeness
– and therefore the consistency – of TS0 over Basic can be obtained by expanding
any model of the latter with an interpretation of the truth predicate resulting from
a positive inductive definition along the lines of the Kripke construction (cf. [4, §5]).
The following observation can be found in [15, Lem. 16].
Lemma 2. ) A,¬A is derivable in TS0 given that A is arithmetical.
3The class of elementary functions E is obtained by closing the initial functions zero(·), suc(·),
+, ⇥, 2x, Pni (x1, ..., xn) = xi with (1  i  n), truncated subtraction x ˙y under the operations
of composition and bounded minimalization:
H(~x) = F (G1(~x), . . . , Gn(~x)); (µt  y) P (~x, t) =
(
the least t  y s.t. P (~x, t)
0, if there is no such t
where F,G are elementary functions and P an elementary predicate. EA has su cient resources
to naturally introduce new relations corresponding to the elementary functions by proving their
defining equations. In particular, the functions in E are exactly the functions that can be ⌃1-
defined in EA (see [25, §3.1]).
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The principles of TS0 are therefore just right to capture the desired assertability
conditions for truth ascriptions: its basic truth-theoretic principles (T1)-(T2) are
in fact not as strong as the classical Tarski-biconditionals: otherwise they would
lead to inconsistency. But they are also stronger than mere inference rules, as the
latter do not allow for conditionalization for arithmetical sentences.
In addition, we can think of TS0 as a minimal internal axiomatization of a fixed-
point construction along the lines of Kripke’s [20]. The fixed-points we are inter-
ested in are in fact fixed-points of a monotone operator J associated with the Basic
De Morgan evaluation scheme.4 The crucial property of Kripke style fixed points
S, i.e. sets of sentences S such that J (S) = S, is that every sentence A is in S i↵
T(pAq) is in S. By combining this fact with the notion of satisfaction introduced
on p.3 we can easily see that for a fixed point S, the model (N, S) satisfies TS0
when S is taken to be the extension of the truth predicate. Moreover, for (N, S) to
satisfy TS0, S has to contain the same sentences as J (S). This means that S is a
fixed-point of J i↵ (N, S) satisfies TS0, and therefore it is an internal axiomatiza-
tion of the fixed-point construction in the sense of §1. Moreover any LT-theory in
BDM satisfying the adequacy condition just considered will contain the principles
of TS0.
2.3. Intermezzo on arithmetization. In what follows, we assume a canonical
Go¨del numbering for LT-expressions. For a fixed expression e of LT, we will use
the usual Go¨del corners for the closed term of LT representing Go¨del number #e of
e. Therefore, for formulas A of LT, we will have pAq = #A. Similarly, for sequents
  )  , p  )  q = # )  , where the Go¨del code of   )   is taken to be an
ordered pair whose components are the codes of the finite sets   and  .5 Closed
terms standing for specific Go¨del codes of LT-expressions contrast with open terms
standing for templates to generate such closed terms: a well-known example of such
a template is the open LT-term sub(pA(v)q, pvq, num(x)), standing for the result of
formally substituting, in the formulaA(v), the free variable v with the numeral for x.
To distinguish these open terms from specific codes, we use square brackets instead
of Go¨del codes, so that, for instance, [A(x)] stands for sub(pA(v)q, pvq, num(x)).6
This distinction clearly generalizes to sequents and formulas with more than one
free variable: [ ~x )  ~x] refers to the simultaneous substitution in p  )  q of
the variables in the strings ~x with their corresponding numerals, where of course
[ x )  x] is short for sub((p q, p q), pxq, num(x)). When it is clear from the
context which free variable we are formally substituting, we will omit it and treat
sub as a binary function.
In EA we can easily carry out an elementary arithmetization of the standard
syntactic notions and operations such as the notion of being a closed term of LT
(formally, ct(x)), the notion of being a sentence of the language LT (formally,
SentLT(x)), the operation of prepending a truth predicate to x (formally, tr(x)),
and so on (see e.g. [2]). Theories will be elementary presented sets of axioms
and rules, and we write AxT (x) for ‘x is an axiom of T ’. Variations of canonical
4For a definition of the operator and the evaluation scheme we refer the reader to Halbach [14,
section 15.1].
5We assume that the code of the finite set   is the code of the sequence of codes of formulas
in   in ascending order.
6The square brackets notation is often replaced by the so-called Feferman dot notation, in
which, for instance, sub(pA(v)q, pvq, num(x)) is abbreviated with pA(x˙)q.
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provability will be particularly relevant in what follows, especially in our discussion
of reflection. We list them here accompanied by their intuitive meaning:
PrfT (x, y) ‘x is a proof in T of the sequent y’
PrT (x) ‘x is a provable sequent in T ’
ThmT (x) ‘x is a theorem of T , that is the ‘sequent’ (p?q, x) is provable in T ’
Pr2T (x, y) ‘the inference from the sequent x to the sequent y
is provably admissible in T ’
We conclude by commenting on the predicate Pr2T (x, y). In addition to being
admissible, a provably admissible rule in a theory T requires the existence of a
T -provable proof transformation of the proof of the premise into a proof of the
conclusion of the rule.7 Pr2T enjoys generalized versions of some of the properties
usually ascribed to provability predicates:
If
 (x))  (x)
⇥(x)) ⇤(x) is admissible in T , provably in Basic, then(Pr1)
Basic `) Pr2T ([ (x))  (x)], [⇥(x)) ⇤(x)])
If the sequents(Pr2)
) Pr2T ([ (x))  (x)], [⇥(x)) ⇤(x)]);
and
) PrT ([ (x))  (x)])
are derivable in Basic, then also
) PrT ([⇥(x)) ⇤(x)])
is derivable in Basic.
2.4. The weakness of TS0 and the advantages of reflection in BDM. To
evaluate the theories of truth considered in this work we list a number of desiderata.
Many of them have been already proposed and discussed by truth-theorists – see for
instance [21] and [17]. As already emphasized, we consider the intersubstitutivity
of ' and Tp'q as guiding principle and therefore we do not argue for it but take
it as primitive.8 In addition, we require our truth predicate to be compositional,
therefore enabling us to explain how we can understand complex sentences only
on the basis of an understanding of its compounds and its logical structure. In
particular, we prefer theories that, given a set of logical constants, allow the truth
predicate to commute with these constants for all sentences of the language, that
is we require compositionality in quantified form and not only compositionality in
schematic form. Finally, we aim at proof-theoretically strong theories of truth. The
desideratum of strength can be motivated in several ways: following the broadly
7For instance, although the rule of cut applied to ‘geometric’ formulations of Robinson’s arith-
metic Q is admissible in it, cut is not provably admissible in Q as this procedure is of hyperex-
ponential growth rate. (For a geometric presentation of Robinson’s arithmetic and for the cut
elimination for it, see [22].)
8This immediately yields the identity of inner and outer logic as defined in [14,21].
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abductive picture sketched in [27], one might simply argue that a theory that proves
more, all other things being equal, has a higher scientific status than a weaker one.
Moreover, truth has served a foundational role in several philosophical programmes,
such as Feferman’s predicativism or Aczel’s attempt to recover Frege’s foundations
[1,8], and therefore a stronger theory might provide alternative, and perhaps more
appealing, formulations of theories of sets or of other mathematical objects.9
In the light of these criteria TS0, although natural, simple, and fully disquota-
tional, is clearly not completely adequate. For one thing, it is not compositional
in the required sense. For a universally quantified sentence such as 8xA(x), for
instance, TS0 cannot how its truth value depends on the truth values of its com-
pounds A(t) because the sequent 8xT([Ax])) T(p8xA(x)q) is not derivable for all
A.
Closely related to the criterion of strength is the capability of a theory of proving
the soundness of its base theory. This claim, in our setting, takes the form of the
global reflection principle for Basic, i.e.
(GRFBasic) ThmBasic(x)) T(x),
which is not derivable in TS0. The underivability of the global reflection principle
directly follows from the fact that TS0 is a conservative extension of Basic. There-
fore, in terms of strength measured with respect to Basic, TS0 is as bad as it can
get. Conservativeness, however, is only a boundary that one can use to partition
truth theories into conservative and non-conservative ones. To distinguish between
non-conservative extensions of Basic, finer-grained measures are required: one op-
tion is to consider how many arithmetical sentences a theory of truth proves (or
equivalently, how much arithmetical transfinite induction the theory proves). This,
however, does not directly take into account general claims involving the truth
predicate that we would like to consider. Therefore, to measure the strength of
our theories of truth we will consider the amount of transfinite induction for the
language LT that is provable in them. This criterion has the advantage of giving us
direct information about how many truth iterations are provable in a theory (see
§4).
Following a strategy already proposed and defended in [18] for theories formu-
lated in classical logic, one may think of TS0 as implicitly containing stronger prin-
ciples, including compositional ones and principles of transfinite induction. This
relation of implicit containment can be unfolded via postulating a hierarchy of re-
flection principles over TS0. Traditionally, reflection principles for a theory T are
explicit soundness assertions (“whatever is provable in T , is true”). The soundness
of T is naturally expressed via GRFT .
10 However, by Tarski’s undefinability the-
orem, GRFT can only be formulated if the expressive resources of T are increased
with a fresh truth predicate. Therefore, if one wants to express soundness in an
arithmetical language, one must resort to schemata. A well-known candidate is
what is widely known as the uniform reflection principle for T :
(RFNT ) 8x(ThmT ([A(x)])! A(x))
9Our criteria more or less correspond to the ones listed in [21], except of course the one requiring
classical logic.
10This reading of reflection is ubiquitous in the literature. See for instance the classical hand-
book entry [26] and [14]. Kreisel and Le´vy in [19] clearly states that global reflection is the
intended soundness claim for a theory T .
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RFNT states that, for every number x, if A is satisfied by the numeral for x, provably
in T , then A is satisfied by x. However, we are mainly concerned with languages
that do contain a truth predicate. In this context, therefore, the most natural way
to express the soundness of a theory is by means of global reflection. In fact, if the
truth predicate satisfies minimal conditions, the global reflection principles implies
all instances of uniform reflection for a theory T .
There is therefore an intuitive connection between uniform and global reflection:
both are intended to express the soundness of the base theory. It turns out, however,
that this connection is lost in the classical axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed point
construction considered by Leigh and Horsten in [18]. For T an axiomatization
of Kripke’s fixed point construction in classical logic, in fact, the result of adding
GRFT to it determines a severe restriction of the class of acceptable models: all
consistent fixed points are excluded, i.e., if (N, S) models T +GRFT with S a fixed
point, then S is inconsistent.11 By contrast, T +RFNT can have models of the form
(N, S) for S a consistent fixed point (in fact all consistent fixed points).
There is a natural explanation for the internal inconsistency of T + GRFT : clas-
sical theories T of the sort just mentioned are in fact unsound with respect to the
notion of truth captured by T , and GRFT makes this explicit. In fact, many theo-
rems involving the truth predicate in a classical axiomatization T of the fixed-point
construction based on Basic De Morgan Logic are outside the extension of the truth
predicate given by consistent fixed points. The classical tautology  _¬  involving
a liar sentence is one such example. Uniform reflection alone, in theories such as
T , does not su ce to uncover their unsoundness:12 this is the sense in which the
intimate connection between global and uniform reflection is lost in the classical
setting considered here.13
The close connections between the two forms of reflection just considered, how-
ever, can be restored by moving to internal axiomatizations of (Basic De Morgan)
Kripke fixed points such as extensions of TS0. To see this, we first reformulate both
principles in rule form and adapt them to the sequent-style formulation of TS0 we
have chosen.
) ThmT ([Ax])
(RFNRT )) A(x)
) SentLT(x) ^ ThmT (x)
(GRFRT )) Tx
Finally, we introduce an extension of TS0 obtained by replacing the axioms (T1)
and (T2) with
(i) A(x)) T[Ax];
(ii) T[Ax]) A(x).
We call the resulting system UTS0 (“uniform TS0). We can now establish that not
only uniform and global reflection are connected in Basic De Morgan logic, but that
they actually coincide.
11By the diagonal lemma, the arithmetical part of T already proves ( ^¬Tp q)_ (¬ ^Tp q)
for   a liar sentence. Therefore T + GRFT proves T
 
p(  ^ ¬Tp q) _ (¬  ^Tp q)q). Since T is an
axiomatization of the class of Kripke fixed points, we can use compositional and truth-iteration
principles to obtain, still in T +GRFT , T(p ^¬ q). A well-known example of such a theory T is
a the theory KF from [8] – see also [14].
12This is also the reason why Horsten and Leigh could consider iterations of uniform reflection
without restrictions on the fixed-points models.
13This phenomenon is not confined to axiomatizations of Kripke fixed points based on De
Morgan Logic. Also in supervaluational fixed points uniform and global reflection come apart.
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Proposition 1. Let T contain UTS0. Then T +RFN
R
T and T +GRF
R
T are identical
theories.
Proof. We start by showing that global reflection entails uniform reflection. Rea-
soning in T + GRFRT , we assume that the sequent ) ThmT ([Ax]) is derivable in it.
Then, by GRFRT , we have T[Ax] and therefore Ax by (ii) above.
For the other direction, we reason in T + RFNRT and assume that the sequent
) SentLT(x) ^ ThmT (x) is derivable in it. Also, we know that (i) and (ii) are
derivable sequents of UTS0 – and then also of T –, and therefore ) PrT (x, [Tx])
is a derivable sequent of T . By combining this latter fact with our assumption, we
obtain) ThmT ([Tx]). By RFNRT , therefore, we can conclude) Tx, as desired. ⇤
Proposition 1 suggests that Leigh and Horsten’s project can be more coherently
carried in the context of nonclassical theories of truth. In the next section we will
in fact employ strengthenings of the reflection principles considered in Proposition
1 to unfold the truth-theoretic and mathematical content implicit in the acceptance
of TS0.
3. Reflecting on TS0
This section introduces the main results of the paper: in §3.1 we discuss several
alternative reflection rules and motivate the choice of a particular form of reflection
on admissible rules that turns out to be stronger than simple reflection on derivable
sequents. In §3.2 we show that the closure under two applications of our rule of
reflection su ces to recover the strong internal axiomatization of Kripke’s fixed
point PKF. Finally, in §3.3 we show that the result of reflecting twice on TS0
proves more transfinite induction for the language with the truth predicate than
PKF itself. We conclude the section by investigating further iterations of reflection.
3.1. Reflection on sequents and rules. As we have seen, in the classical setting
the uniform reflection schema and rule take the form:
ThmT ([A(x)])) A(x)(RFNRT )
) ThmT ([A(x)])
) A(x)(URFN
R
T )
Over EA, URFNRT and RFN
R
T are equivalent, as shown by Feferman in [5]. In the
non-trivial direction, i.e. going from the rule to the initial sequent, one shows that
Basic su ces to formalize the fact that the sentence PrfT (n¯, p) A(m¯)q) ! A(m¯)
is provable in T for any m,n 2 !. Therefore one application of (URFNRT ) yields
(RFNRT ).
In the nonclassical setting the situation is di↵erent. Whereas with classical logic
on the background we can formulate (URFNRT ) and (RFN
R
T ) in a one-sided sequent
calculus, there are good reasons to stick with a two-sided calculus for Basic De
Morgan logic. In a one-sided classical system, in fact, sequents A,¬A play the
role that initial sequents A ) A play in a two-sided setting. In our system this
correspondence breaks down: first of all, A,¬A is not generally valid in our intended
semantics – if A is a liar sentence, for instance –, whereas A) A are initial sequents
of our system. Moreover, there is no conditional naturally corresponding to the
sequent arrow since ) A! A is just a notational variant of ) A _ ¬A.
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We therefore opt for a formulation of our first reflection principle as applying
to provable (two-sided) sequents. As a consequence, basic syntactic considerations
force us to formulate reflection in rule-form. The uniform reflection principle for
sequents of T takes the following form:
(rT )
) PrT ([ ~x)  ~y ])
 )  
But the simple rule of reflection (rT ) is not the only form of reflection that will be
relevant for what follows. A suitable conditional – such as the classical or the intu-
itionistic conditional – enables one to compress in one sequent chains of reasoning
featuring embedded implications. In our setting, the highly meta-theoretic nature
of the sequent arrow forces us to capture these chains of reasoning explicitly via
suitable extensions of the simple reflection rule (rT ). One way to achieve this is to
focus not only on provable sequents, but also to take into account rules admissible
in T via the provability predicate Pr2T (x, y) introduced above.
We define the uniform reflection principle for provably admissible rules in T :
) Pr2T ([ (x))  (x)], [⇥(x)) ⇤(x)])  (x))  (x)
⇥(x)) ⇤(x)(RT )
Obviously, in the context of any reasonable theory T , the theory T + rT is a sub-
theory of T + RT . The rule RT states that if there is a uniform T -provable proof
transformation of a proof of  (n) )  (n) into a proof of ⇥(n) ) ⇤(n) for each
n 2 !, and moreover  (x))  (x) is provable, then also ⇥(x)) ⇤(x) is provable.
The rule RT is in a sense supplementing BDM with the possibility of dealing with
chains of reasoning involving sequents. It is based on a formalization of admissible
rules, which in the context of classical logic are easily compressed into sentence
form and combined, informally, via conditionalization and transitivity. Although it
increases the expressive power of the theories in BDM, however, it is clear that RT
does not amount to restoring classical logic, as these chains of reasoning can only
be managed in the safe and controlled environment guaranteed by the formalization
in the support theory: the rule RT relies essentially on the syntactic capabilities of
the background non-logical principles and is clearly not a logical principle. More
importantly, the acceptability of our reflection principles, just like the acceptability
of any other reflection principle, is based on preservation of soundness: as we shall
see later on, the addition of RT to our theories of truth preserves not only soundness
but all semantic properties of the theories of truth in BDM, intersubstitutivity in
primis, and therefore it can be safely assumed regardless of how it interacts with
the underlying logic.
If T is an axiomatizable theory, then the reflection on T is the closure of Basic
under the reflection rules r(T ) and R(T ):
r(T ) := Basic+ (rT )
R(T ) := Basic+ (RT )
Theories obtained by iterating our reflection rules are then defined in a standard
manner: for instance, R(R(T )) is the result of closing R(T ) under RR(T ). We ab-
breviate R(R(T )) as R2(T ), and similarly for more iterations.
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logic logical initial sequents and rules of BDM
identity Id1, Id2
arithmetic ) A for A a basic axiom of EA
plus the full induction rule for LT:
 , A(x)) A(x+ 1¯), 
(IND)
 , A(0)) A(t), 
atomic truth (T =1) ct(x), ct(y), val(x) = val(y)) T(x=. y)
(T =2) ct(x), ct(y),T(x=. y)) val(x) = val(y)
(TT1) T[Tx]) Tx
(TT2) Tx) T[Tx]
truth principles (T^1) SentLT(x .^ y),T(x) ^ T(y)) T(x .^ y)
for connectives (T^2) SentLT(x .^ y),T(x .^ y)) T(x) ^ T(y)
(T_1) SentLT(x_. y),T(x) _ T(y)) T(x .^ y)
(T_2) SentLT(x_. y),T(x_. y)) T(x) _ T(y)
(T¬1) SentLT(x),T(¬. x)) ¬T(x)
(T¬2) SentLT(x),¬T(x)) T(¬. x)
truth principles (T81) SentLT(8.yx), 8yTx(y/v)) T(8.yx)
for quantifiers (T82) SentLT(8.yx),T(8.yx)) 8yTx(y/v)
(T91) SentLT(9.yx), 9yTx(y/v)) T(9.yx)
(T92) SentLT(9.yx),T(9.yx)) 9yTx(y/v)
Table 2. The theory PKF
We have introduced (RT ) as a generalization of (rT ). A natural question is
whether (RT ) is actually stronger than the simpler rule. We will not answer to
this question in this paper but we will prove some facts that may be relevant for
a future answer. For instance, we now provide an upper bound for the strength
of r(UTS0); later – cf. Proposition 3 – we will show that the resulting theory is a
proper subtheory of R2(TS0).
The upper bound for r(UTS0) that we now provide is given in terms of the theory
PKF that was mentioned in the introduction. PKF is also formulated in the language
LT, and its axioms and rules are displayed in Table 2.
In T=1 2, the function symbol =. represents the elementary syntactic operation
of forming an identity statement out of two terms. A similar notation will be
applied for other syntactic operations. As mentioned earlier, PKF is an internal
axiomatization of Kripke’s theory of truth. Crucially, PKF is fully compositional
as also negation commutes with the truth predicate. Halbach and Horsten in [15]
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have measured the proof-theoretic strength of PKF by showing that PKF proves
arithmetical transfinite induction up to the ordinal '!0. Therefore we can use PKF
as means of comparison for our theories of iterated reflection.
Proposition 2. r(UTS0) is a subtheory of PKF.
Proof. To prove Proposition 2 we only need to check that PKF can handle reflection.
Therefore we first establish that PKF is strong enough to prove the soundness of
UTS0. To this end, for ordinal codes ↵, we define a hierarchy of predicates Tr↵(·)
as T(·) ^ SentL<↵T (·), where L<↵ is defined as L plus all predicates T  for   < ↵
(cf. [14, Ch. 9]).14 Halbach and Horsten establish in [15] that PKF proves the
predicates Tr  to behave like Tarskian truth predicates for   < !!: that is for
formulas of LT that are in L<!T , the classical commutation conditions for typed
truth predicates hold, while for LT-formulas A not in L!T, we can prove ¬Tr!pAq.
We can extend this definition to sequents via the predicate TR↵(·) in the following
way:
TR↵(p )  q) :$
 
(Tr↵(p
V
 q)! Tr↵(pW q)) ^
(Tr↵(p¬W q)! Tr↵(p¬V q) 
From the proof-theoretic analysis of PKF in [15] we know that the truth predicates
up to !! behave classically in it, and that we can employ the material conditional
to carry out the inductive proof of the following:
(1) PKF `) PrUTS0([ x)  x])! TR!([ x)  x])
The proof employs the induction rule of PKF. It su ces, therefore, to establish
) PrfUTS0(0, [ x)  x])! TR!([ x)  x])(2)
PrfUTS0(u, [ x)  x])! TR!([ x)  x]))(3)
PrfUTS0(u+ 1, [ x)  x])! TR![ x)  x])
where PrfT (x, y) expresses that y is provable in T with a proof of length less or
equal to x.
We consider the crucial case of the characterizing principles of UTS0, (i)-(ii) on
page 8. Reasoning classically in PKF, we assume
(4) ) PrfUTS0(0, [T[Ax]) Ax])
We need to show
) Tr![T[Ax]]! Tr![Ax](5)
) Tr![¬Ax]! Tr![¬T[Ax]](6)
We start with (5) and reason informally: If Tr![T[Ax]], then for some n 2 ! and
m < n, Trn[Tm[Ax]]. Therefore, since Trn and Trm are Tarskian truth predicates,
also Trn[Ax].
Similarly for (6), if Tr![¬Ax], then Trn[¬Ax] for some n 2 !, and, since Trn[Ax]
is in Ln+1T , also Trn+1¬[Tn[Ax]] and therefore Tr![¬T[Ax]]. ⇤
14The truth predicates Tr↵ can be defined for as many ordinals as we can code in our theory.
In §3.3, in particular, we will employ a coding for ordinals smaller than  0.
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3.2. Recovering compositionality by reflection. One of the goals of this sec-
tion is to show that by reflecting on our core laws of truth we can recover desirable
compositional principles. More specifically, reflecting on TS0 is su cient to recover
the initial sequents and the full induction rule of PKF.
In a first step we show that adding the reflection principle for TS0 to Basic allows
us to derive the initial sequents of UTS0.
Lemma 3. UTS0 ✓ r(TS0).
Proof. For all n 2 ! we have TS0 ` T(pA(n)q)) A(n). Therefore, Basic proves:
(7) ) 8y(SentLT(y)! AxTS0(sub(pTxq, num(y)), y))
and
(8) ) 8x (SentL([Bx]),
where, we recall, [Bx] := sub(pBvq, num(x)) for all LT-formulas B with one free
variable. Therefore, by combining (7) and (8), we also have in Basic
(9) ) AxTS0(sub(pTxq, num([Ax]), [Ax]))
Therefore, by definition of the canonical provability predicate PrTS0 ,
(10) ) PrTS0(sub(pTxq, num([Ax])), [Ax])
Let tr(x) be the elementary function that formally prefixes pTq to the numeral for
x. Then Basic also proves the equation:
) sub(pTxq, num([Ax])) = sub(tr([Av]), num(x))(11)
By performing the appropriate substitution in (10), we have
(12) ) PrTS0(sub(tr([Av]), num(x)), [Ax]).
The other direction is analogous.
In r(TS0) – and a fortiori in R(TS0) – therefore, we obtain
T[Ax]) A(x)
A(x)) T[Ax]
as desired. ⇤
As a consequence of the previous lemma, in r(TS0) we can already prove the full
truth sequents for atomic arithmetical formulas and for truth ascriptions containing
free variables (T =1), (T =2), (TT1), and (TT2). That (TT1) and (TT2) are direct
instances of the initial truth sequents of UTS0 is immediate. For the identity
initial sequents, a slightly more general version of the Tarski sequents would be
required, namely one in which at least two free variables appear. However, since
we are working over Basic, we can always assume that the free variable in the truth
sequents of UTS0 stands for (the code of) a string of free variables of finite length.
Also the initial, compositional sequents of PKF for the propositional connectives
^,_,¬ can be proved in r(TS0):
Lemma 4. In r(TS0) we can derive (T^1-2), (T_1-2), (T¬1-2).
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Proof. In TS0 we can directly prove the schematic form of the compositional clauses,
for example TS0 ` T(pAq) ^ T(pBq) ) (TpA ^ Bq) for all LT-sentences A,B. By
formalizing this fact in Basic, we obtain
(13) ) PrTS0([SentLT(x .^ y),Tx ^ Ty ) T(x .^ y)]).
In r(TS0), therefore, we can then move from the formalization to the full quantifiable
statement
(14) SentLT(x .^ y),Tx ^ Ty ) T(x .^ y)
as desired. The case for the other connectives are analogous. ⇤
However, by looking at Table 2 one realizes that compositional initial sequents
for the propositional connectives by themselves are not enough to capture all truth
principles of PKF: we also need initial sequents for quantifiers and full induction
for LT (IND). We will first show how to recover full induction.
It is a well known result that, in arithmetical context, (uniformly) reflecting on
EA su ces to obtain the full induction schema for L. Kreisel and Le´vy, in [19],
proved the equivalence of uniform reflection and full induction over EA – that is the
equivalence of EA plus uniform reflection for EA and Peano Arithmetic (PA).15 We
will apply Kreisel and Levy’s strategy to our setting. In order to do so, however,
their original argument has to be modified in several respects. First of all, we
allow formulas of LT and not just of L to appear in instances of the induction
schema. In addition, we have to consider an induction rule because the induction
axiom involving the material conditional fails to be sound in the setting of Basic
De Morgan Logic. Finally, already in this step, we shall employ our generalized
reflection rule RT instead of the basic reflection rule rT . In what follows we denote
as PAT the version of PA formulated in LT whose logic is BDM and in which the
truth predicate can appear in instances of induction.
Lemma 5. PAT ✓ R(Basic)
Proof. Let A(x) be a formula in LT with one free variable. We want to show that
in R(Basic) the full induction rule
(15)
 , A(x)) A(x+ 1¯), 
 , A(0)) A(t), 
for formulas of LT is admissible. The following inference is admissible in Basic –
and in fact in predicate logic in LT only – for any n 2 !:
(16)
 , A(x)) A(x+ 1¯), 
 , A(0)) A(n¯), 
By (Pr1), since the proof transformation in (16) is elementary, Basic proves
(17) ) Pr2Basic(p , A(x)) A(x+ 1¯), q, p , A(0)) A(y˙), q)
Now by assumption, (17), and RBasic we conclude
 , A(0)) A(y), 
⇤
15See Beklemishev [2, Cor. 4.3] for a proof of this fact.
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The full set of compositional sequents of PKF is obtained by complementing the
clauses for the connectives by the ones for quantifiers. This can be achieved by
closing the theory R(TS0) under RR(TS0), that is, by performing one iteration of the
general reflection rule.
Lemma 6. R2(TS0) proves (T81 2) and (T91 2).
Proof. We prove T81; the other cases are treated similarly. For all LT-formulas
A(v) with only v free, R(TS0) proves
T[Ay]) A(y) by Lemma 3
8yT[Ay]) 8y A(y) by logic
8yT[Ay]) Tp8y A(y)q by (T2)
The argument just carried out in R(TS0) can uniformly be formalized in Basic, i.e.,
Basic proves:
) PrR(TS0)(pSentLT(8.yx˙), 8yTx˙(y/v)) T(8y x˙(y/v))q)
Therefore R2(TS0) su ces to conclude
SentLT(8.yx), 8yTx(y/v)) T(8y x(y/v)),
as desired. ⇤
Corollary 1. PKF ✓ R2(TS0).
Corollary 1 shows that two iterations of the generalized rule RTS0 over our basic
theory TS0 su ces to recover all compositional truth laws that weren’t immediately
provable in the original theory as well as the full induction rule for the full language
LT. If reflection is considered to be a procedure already implicit in the acceptance
of TS0, then the laws of PKF follow naturally from a few applications of this process.
However, it is natural to ask whether the inclusion established in Cor. 1 is proper.
These questions translate, on the conceptual side, into the task of approximating
the set of sentences that are valid in the intended models of our theories, which are
the Kripke fixed-point models. In doing so, we gather information on how many
truth iterations and general claims involving truth we are permitted to assert upon
accepting TS0 (after reflection) and how many mathematical patterns of reasoning
we regain in the form of transfinite induction.
3.3. Recovering transfinite induction by reflection. In this section we inves-
tigate the question of how much transfinite induction for LT can be recovered in
iterations of the generalized reflection rule over TS0. One of the upshots of our
analysis will be that R2(TS0) properly extends PKF.
To carry out our proofs, we need to assume a notation system (OT, ) for ordinals
up to the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal  0 as it can be found, for instance, in [24]. OT
is a primitive recursive set of ordinal codes and   a primitive recursive relation on
OT that is isomorphic to the usual ordering of ordinals up to  0. We distinguish
between fixed ordinal codes, which we denote with ↵, ,   . . ., and ⇣, ⌘, ✓ . . . as
abbreviations for variables ranging over elements of OT. From the results in [15] it
follows that PKF proves transfinite induction for LT only up to any ordinal smaller
than !!. If we focus only on L-formulas, however, PKF proves that much higher
ordinals are well-ordered, in particular, PKF proves the same arithmetical sentences
as PA plus transfinite induction for L up to any ordinal smaller than '!0.
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Before analyzing how much transfinite induction can be proved in R2(TS0), we
introduce some notation. The schema of transfinite induction up to ↵ for the
formula A(v) of a language L1 containing L is the rule
8⇠   ⌘ A(⇠)) A(⌘)
TIL1(A,↵)) 8⇠   ↵ A(⇠)
We then denote transfinite induction up to some ordinal ↵ with TIL1(< ↵), standing
for the closure under all rules TIL1(A, ) for A 2 L1 and     ↵. Analogously, we
write TIL1(↵) for the closure under all rules TIL1(A,↵) for A 2 L1. In what follows,
we will only deal with the cases in which L1 is either L itself or LT.
As a measure of strength of the theories obtained via iteration of reflection we
will mainly focus on how much transfinite induction for LT is derivable in such the-
ories. However, there is often a direct connection between the amount of transfinite
induction for LT and L derivable in a truth theory. Both in the case of KF and PKF,
for instance, the amount of transfinite induction for LT available in the systems –
that is TILT(< '10) and TILT(< '0!) respectively – can be used to define classical,
Tarskian truth predicates indexed by these ordinals with the crucial contribution of
the compositional truth principles of the two theories (see Fefeman’s [8] for KF and
Halbach and Horsten’s [15] for PKF). This gives a lower bound for the systems in
terms of ramified truth hierarchies up to '10 (or "0) and '0! (or !!) respectively,
which – by a classical result by Feferman (cf. [7]) – yields that KF and PKF are
proof-theoretically as strong as at least PA+TILT(< '"00) and PA+TILT(< '!0)
respectively.
The following proposition shows that iterating the generalized reflection rule
twice over TS0 enables us to go beyond PKF. This also gives us more information
about the question that was posed on page 10 about the comparison between the
rules (rT ) and (RT ). By Proposition 2, the theory r(UTS0) is a subtheory of PKF.
The next will entail that R2(TS0) is indeed stronger than PKF.
Proposition 3. R2(Basic) ` TILT(!!)
Proof. We first prove in R(Basic) that, for all n 2 !,
(18)
 , 8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘), 
 ) 8⇣   !n A(⇣), 
To prove (18), we first prove in R(Basic), for all n 2 !:
(19)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + !n A(⇣)
We reason as follows in R(Basic):
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)(20)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + !0 A(⇣) by (20)(21)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + !n A(⇣) external ind. hyp.(22)
8⇣   ⌘ + (!n ⇥ x)A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + (!n ⇥ x) + !nA(⇣) from (22)(23)
8⇣   ⌘ + (!n ⇥ 0) A(⇣)) 8x 8⇣   ⌘ + (!n ⇥ x) A(⇣) by (IND)(24)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + !n+1 A(⇣)(25)
The last two lines give us the induction step and therefore (19) by, possibly, a series
of cuts.
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Now in Basic,
(26) ) Pr2R(Basic)([8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)], [8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + !x A(⇣)])
Therefore, in R2(Basic),
(27)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8x 8⇣   ⌘ + !x A(⇣)
That is
(28)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) 8⇣   ⌘ + !! A(⇣)
From (28), by letting ⌘ to be 0, we get
(29)
 , 8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘), 
 ) 8⇣   !! A(⇣), 
⇤
By the proof theoretic analysis of PKF we know that it can only prove transfinite
induction for LT for ordinals smaller than !!. But this fact is not dependent in
any way on the truth theoretic principles of PKF: already PAT, in fact, proves
TILT(< !!). This is also reflected by the fact that Proposition 3 does not rely on
the truth principles of TS0. However, by Corollary 1, we have:
Corollary 2. PKF is a proper subtheory of R2(TS0).
Transfinite induction up to !!, however, is clearly not the limit of what we can
achieve in R2(Basic). By using similar methods to the ones employed in Proposition
3, and starting from (28), we can verify that the following rule is admissible in
R2(Basic):
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!+k A(⇣)
Generalizing this strategy it is possible to show the following:
Lemma 7. In R(n+1)(Basic) the following rule is admissible:
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥nA(⇣)
Proof. By external induction on n. We have established the claim for n = 1.
Assume that it holds for n. Then we can argue in R(n+1)(Basic): Assume
8⇣   ⌘ A(⇣)) A(⌘)
then by the induction hypothesis we have
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥nA(⇣)
and
8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n ⇥ xA(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n ⇥ x+ !!⇥nA(⇣).
By the induction principle (IND) we obtain
8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n ⇥ 0A(⇣)) 8x 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n ⇥ xA(⇣)
giving us
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n ⇥ !A(⇣)
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which is
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n+1A(⇣)
Therefore, by iterating this argument m-times, we can obtain, for each m:
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥n+mA(⇣)
In R(n+2)(Basic), therefore, we can conclude
8⇣   ✓A(⇣)) 8⇣   ✓ + !!⇥(n+1)A(⇣).
⇤
Lemma 7 immediately entails that Rn+1(Basic) proves TILT(< !!⇥n). Therefore,
if we reflect on TS0 instead of Basic, we are able to define in Rn(TS0) ramified truth
predicates for any ordinal smaller than !!⇥n by following the strategy employed
by Halbach and Horsten in [15] and hinted at on page 16.
This strategy can be iterated even further. Ideally, we would like to reach, by as
little reflection iterations as possible, the amount of transfinite induction for LT –
and therefore of ramified truth predicates – that are available in KF, the classical
counterpart of PKF. However, we conclude this section by providing only a first,
and presumably rather ine cient, approximation to this task.
By letting R!(Basic) :=
S
n2! R
n(Basic), a direct consequence of Lemma 7 is
that
Corollary 3. In R!(Basic) we have TILT(< !(!
2))
Therefore the theory R!(TS0) can define ramified truth predicates indexed by
all ordinals !!⇥n for all natural numbers n.
Although ! may seem to be a natural stopping point, the procedure can be iter-
ated even further into the transfinite. Following a well-known tradition initiated by
Feferman in [6], the theories Rn(Basic) can all be shown to be recursively enumer-
able. Moreover, the notion of being a proof in Rn(Basic) is recursive. We can then
find a primitive recursive function enumerating all those proof predicates. By em-
ploying the recursion theorem, therefore, we can find an index for this enumeration
that can be used to formalize, via a recursive predicate, the notion of being a proof
employing rules proper of one of the theories Rn(Basic). This, however, su ces to
formulate the notion of being a proof in R!(Basic): clearly, similar procedure can
be extended at least to ordinals smaller than "0.
But once a recursive formalization of transfinite iterations of our reflection rules
is available, it becomes clear that enough iterations of reflection over Basic will lead
us to the amount of transfinite induction for LT available in KF. By letting !0 := 1,
and !n+1 := !!n , we have, rather unsurprisingly,
Observation 1. R!n+1(Basic) ` TILT(!n)
4. Conclusion
Starting with principles that are minimally constitutive of the notion of truth, such
as the initial sequents of the theory TS0, we have investigated the result of iterating
reflection rules over them. A similar project, in the context of classical logic and
therefore without the basic principles of TS0, has been recently pursued by Horsten
and Leigh [18]. We claim that for two reasons our nonclassical setting provides a
more coherent framework for such a project for two main reasons. First, in a classi-
cal setting the interderivability of A and TpAq (which is the defining characteristic
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of TS0) cannot be consistently maintained. Second, following a theme by Kreisel,
the global reflection GRFT for a theory T is the intended soundness extension of T .
Other proof theoretic reflection principles, including the uniform reflection princi-
ple RFNT , are only justified by an appeal to global reflection. However, as shown
in §2.3, in classical axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed point constructions, the use
of the global reflection principle is at odds with the overall strategy of iterating
reflection rules.
One way to understand the results of this article is by asking which statements
TS0 and the result of iterating reflection rules over it can prove to be true, i.e.,
by considering their provable sequents of the form ) TpAq for A in LT or, in
short, at their truth theorems. The logic BDM in itself – i.e. without identity –
has no theorems at all. When initial sequents for identity are added to it as well
as arithmetical initial sequents, even if the truth predicate is in the signature of
the theory, one only obtains arithmetical theorems but no truth theorems. TS0, by
contrast, does prove truth theorems, but only truth theorems of the form
T . . .T| {z }
n-times
pAq
where A is an arithmetical theorem of Basic. This shortcoming of TS0 is accom-
panied by the lack of other desirable properties of the theory, such as full compo-
sitionality (see again §2.3). By adding a uniform or global reflection rule to TS0,
we restore our full capability of reasoning inductively with the truth predicate,
and several compositional truth sequents. Full compositionality, together with the
possibility of establishing theorems of the form
T . . .T| {z }
!!+n-times
pAq
for A again an arithmetical theorem of Basic, is reached when we consider the
theory R2(TS0), i.e., via a further iteration of the generalized reflection rule RT
over TS0. At this stage, we already recapture and surpass all truth theorems of
the full compositional theory PKF. A natural goal for the process of iteration
may be to reach the truth theorems of the classical theory KF (or equivalently,
PKF+ TILT(< "0), as shown in [23]). This can be achieved via suitable transfinite
progressions of theories obtained by reflection over TS0.
From a semantic perspective, there is a tight match between the truth theorems
of our theories and the levels of the construction of the minimal fixed point of
Kripke’s construction from [20]. By extending TS0 with an !-rule, this connec-
tion can be made explicit: the theorems of TS0 plus the !-rule are exactly the
LT-sentences that are in the extension of the truth predicate in the minimal fixed
point of Kripke’s theory (see [10] for a recent proof). Uniform reflection princi-
ples are recursive approximations of the !-rule. Therefore iterations of reflection,
and the corresponding truth theorems of the resulting theories, can be seen as ap-
proximations to the full !-rule added to TS0 as they represent initial stages of the
construction of the minimal fixed point. It is also clear that all the theories that
we have considered are internal axiomatizations of Kripke fixed points. Therefore
the hierarchy that we have studied can also be seen as an attempt to capture,
via recursively axiomatized theories, the set of grounded sentences first isolated by
Kripke.
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Nonetheless our work leaves many open questions and possibilities for improve-
ment: from a technical point of view, a sharper proof-theoretic analysis of the
theories obtained by iterated reflection would be desirable to see clearly, for in-
stance, how much one can obtain with finite iterations of reflection. Moreover, it
would be interesting to see whether the reflection rules can be strengthened via
‘higher-order’ reflection rules in such a way that only finitely many iterations of
them could su ce to reach the truth theorems of KF. Finally, there remains the
question whether the gap between TILT(< !!) and TILT(< "0) – which is deter-
mined by whether PA in the signature of LT is formulated in BDM or classical logic
respectively – can be closed by supplementing BDM with a suitable conditional in
such a way that the conceptual advantages of the treatment of truth in TS0 are
preserved.
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